Abstract. This paper considers-for the first time-the concept of keyalternating ciphers in a provable security setting. Key-alternating ciphers can be seen as a generalization of a construction proposed by Even and Mansour in 1991. This construction builds a block cipher P X from an n-bit permutation P and two n-bit keys k0 and k1, setting P X k 0 ,k 1 (x) = k1 ⊕ P (x ⊕ k0). Here we consider a (natural) extension of the EvenMansour construction with t permutations P1, . . . , Pt and t + 1 keys, k0, . . . , kt. We demonstrate in a formal model that such a cipher is secure in the sense that an attacker needs to make at least 2 2n/3 queries to the underlying permutations to be able to distinguish the construction from random. We argue further that the bound is tight for t = 2 but there is a gap in the bounds for t > 2, which is left as an open and interesting problem. Additionally, in terms of statistical attacks, we show that the distribution of Fourier coefficients for the cipher over all keys is close to ideal. Lastly, we define a practical instance of the construction with t = 2 using AES referred to as AES 2 . Any attack on AES 2 with complexity below 2 85 will have to make use of AES with a fixed known key in a non-black box manner. However, we conjecture its security is 2 128 .
Introduction
Block ciphers are one of the fundamental primitives in symmetric cryptography. Often called the work horses of cryptography, they form the backbone of today's secure communication. Therefore, their design has been an important research focus over the last 20 years, giving rise to different well-established strategies to prevent large classes of attacks. As typical examples, one can mention the practical security approach against linear and differential cryptanalysis [22] , and the wide-trail strategy [14] that lead to the design of the AES Rijndael [13] . Another line of research is the so-called provable security approach against statistical attacks, that served as foundation for the block cipher MISTY [26, 27] . One can also mention the decorrelation theory [32] and the design of the ciphers C [1] and KFC [2] . At a high level, the three main design paradigms for block ciphers are Feistel structures such as DES, Lai-Massey ciphers such as IDEA [23] , and key-alternating ciphers [11, 13, 14] for which the AES Rijndael is a prominent representative. State-of-the-art block ciphers are quite well understood and provide security against all known attacks. Though there has recently been remarkable progress in the cryptanalysis of AES [7] , these results are far from being any threat for the use of AES in practice. Thus, from a practical point of view, block ciphers in general and key-alternating ciphers in particular can be seen as a success story.
Given the degree of confidence in properly designed key-alternating ciphers on the practical side (e.g. with AES approved for the encryption of secret and top secret data in the USA), it is even more surprising that there has been no provable setting developed so far for the design of key-alternating ciphers on the theoretical side. Nobody seems to have even formulated the problem of whether the key-alternating cipher makes sense from this point of view. Clearly, given the state of the art, proving AES secure in any strict sense is out of reach. However, by modeling the round functions as fixed public randomly chosen permutations, we are able to precisely formulate and-as we shall see-prove the soundness of the key-alternating cipher design. The cipher we are dealing with is depicted in Figure 2 and detailed in Section 2.
We note the difference of our setting to that of an idealized Feistel cipher, often called the Luby-Rackoff construction [25] , or to that of similar results obtained for the Lai-Massey schemes [33] . In these former works, for each key it is assumed that the function used in the Feistel (resp. Lai-Massey) construction is chosen at random. Directly adopting this model to the case of a key-alternating cipher immediately results in an ideal cipher (even for one round). At the same time, in most key-alternating ciphers including AES, the key is the only part of the design to define the cipher permutation and all round permutations are fixed for the entire cipher, not varying from key to key. In other words, working along the lines of [25] does not elucidate how to mix the key into the state. It is exactly this point we deal with in the present paper, both at a high-level, i.e. in a provable setting, as well as at lower-levels, i.e. considering statistical attacks and as a guideline for actually designing ciphers.
Interestingly, another look at the construction and its properties arises from the question of how to design the key schedule of a block cipher. This has been an open problem in symmetric-key cryptography for decades. While some ciphers are based upon simple linear or nearly linear key schedules [8, 17] , a number of others opt for heavier and often highly nonlinear key schedules, sometimes as complex as the round functions [3] or the cipher itself [30] . In the prominent case of AES, for instance, the key schedule is iterative, mainly linear, and provides relatively slow diffusion in the backward direction. It is precisely these properties that facilitated the related-key cryptanalysis of the full AES-192 and AES-256, e.g. [5, 6] as well as the recent biclique cryptanalysis of all three full AES versions in the classical single-key model [7] . In general, these examples emphasize a relatively weak understanding of key scheduling algorithms, compared to the design of block cipher rounds. In this context, the results of this paper can be seen as a case for simple key schedules (or even no key scheduling at all). Hence, they provide new insights into the design of block ciphers.
Related Work
An exception from the above-mentioned lack of theoretical studies of key-alternating block ciphers is the Even-Mansour construction [15] construction can be seen as a one-round variant of a key-alternating cipher. Informally, Even and Mansour proved that in order to have a reasonable success probability in decrypting an (unqueried) message, an attacker has to make roughly 2 n/2 queries to the permutation P . In this setting, the attacker is given oracle access to P , its inverse, and to an encryption and decryption oracle. Later, Daemen [10] showed that this bound is actually tight. He presented a differential attack on the Even-Mansour scheme that allows to successfully recover the key with a good probability, after 2 n/2 evaluations of both the permutation P and the encryption oracle.
Our Contribution
Our contributions in this paper are twofold.
On the theoretical side (cf. Section 3), we provide the first treatment of the concept of key-alternating ciphers in a provable security setting. We prove below that, for any t-round version of the cipher with randomly drawn and fixed underlying permutations, t ≥ 2, depicted in Figure 2 , an attacker needs to make at least 2 2n/3 queries before being able to distinguish the encryption oracle from a random permutation. Here n is the block size of the cipher. Furthermore, we provide a simple attack that shows that an attacker, by making 2 leave proving this as an important open question (see also Section 7). Note that in this setup, we necessarily only consider the query complexity of an attacker, ignoring the computational complexity. It seems unlikely that an attack with a comparable computational complexity exists. Such an attack would in particular imply an attack on e.g. AES-256 with a complexity of around 2 120 operations. On the practical side, we propose to actually use the construction of Figure 2 . Given our theoretical results, the merit of this approach is the following: Any attack on a key-alternating cipher with complexity below 2 2n/3 will have to make use of the round functions in a non-black box manner.
However, and we feel that it is important to make this point explicit even though it might be obvious, the theoretical result does not carry over to any efficient instance, as one must consider the round functions as black-boxesi.e. objects which the adversary must query to evaluate-in order to meaningfully discuss the distinguishability of the cipher from a random permutation by an information-theoretic adversary.
This fact and the fact that, as mentioned above, the theoretical bounds are likely to be lower than the computational complexity of any attack, motivates us to study the security of our proposal with respect to such statistical attacks as linear cryptanalysis (see Section 5) .
To capture the difference between the single-round Even-Mansour cipher and the multiple-round key-alternating construction with respect to linear cryptanalysis, we study the Fourier spectrum of the ciphers. We prove that once the fixed underlying permutations are close to average (which is the case for randomly drawn permutations with high probability), the distribution of Fourier coefficients for the key-alternating cipher over all keys for t ≥ 2 gets close to that over all permutations -the natural reference point for any block cipher. At the same time, we demonstrate that this is not the case for the original EvenMansour construction with t = 1 where the Fourier coefficients almost do not change from key to key. It seems therefore unlikely that linear attacks are able to break the multiple-round key-alternating cipher with t ≥ 2.
Finally, as the crypto community likes targets and we anticipate that having a concrete proposal is a valuable stimulation for further research, we propose an actual cipher called AES 2 following the 2-round version of the general construction (see Section 6). Here we replace the random permutations by two instantiations of AES-128 with fixed known keys. Given the new AES instructions on recent Intel processors, AES 2 performs very competitively on those platforms, with as few as 2.65 cycles per byte required in the counter mode.
We conclude with a section dedicated to open questions and further work (Section 7), discussing how to possibly improve and extend the research we consider in the paper. AES and used without being explicitly named even before that [11] in similar contexts. Such a cipher consists of round functions interleaved with xoring round keys to the current state. In our idealized model, the round functions are the public, randomly chosen permutations P i and the key consists of t + 1 independent round-keys are k i . More precisely, let P 1 , . . . , P t be permutations from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n , t ≥ 1. Let k 0 , . . . , k t ∈ {0, 1} n be keys. The block cipher E = E k0,...,kt : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n we consider is defined by
for x ∈ {0, 1} n . The cipher is shown in Figure 2 . 
Indistinguishability Analysis
Putting N = 2 n , we define the PRP security of E against an adversary A expecting a (t + 1)-tuple of oracles as
where in each experiment Q, P 1 , . . . , P t are independent and uniformly sampled random permutations. Here A can make inverse queries to each of its oracles. Thus, an attacker has to tell apart two worlds, depicted below.
World 1
E(x)
(cf. Eq. 1)
We note that one must consider the permutations P 1 , . . . , P t as random (or pseudorandom) black-boxes-i.e. objects which the adversary must query to evaluate-in order to meaningfully discuss the distinguishability of E k0,...,kt from a random permutation by an information-theoretic adversary.
We define Adv by a tightening of Proposition 2 below. Theorem 1 is proved by a hybrid argument involving an intermediate game. In order to outline this hybrid argument we start by developing some new notation.
Note firstly that if E is defined as in (1) then, putting P 0 = E −1 , we have
to both sides and then substituting P 0 (·) for the input, we find
It is easy to see that, for fixed k 0 , . . . , k t , randomly sampling P 1 , . . . , P t , defining E as in (1) and giving an adversary access to the tuple of oracles (E, P 1 , . . . , P t ) (and their inverses) is equivalent to sampling P 0 , . . . , P t uniformly at random from all (t + 1)-tuples of permutations satisfying (2) and giving the adversary access to (P −1 0 , P 1 , . . . , P t ) (and their inverses). Moreover, it is just a notational change to give the adversary access to (P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P t ), since the adversary is allowed inverse queries anyway (of course, the adversary is alerted to the fact that its first oracle is now P 0 and not P −1 0 ). We now formally implement the interface (P 0 , . . . , P t ) via an oracle O(N, t) taking k 0 , . . . , k t as implicit parameters. Rather than sampling P 0 , . . . , P t uniformly at random from those sequences satisfying (2) at the start of the experiment, O(N, t) implements the permutations P 0 , . . . , P t by lazy sampling. More precisely, P 0 , . . . , P t are initially set to be undefined everywhere. When the adversary makes a query P i (x) or P −1 i (y), the adversary defines P i at the relevant point using the following procedure, illustrated for the case of a forward query P i (x) (the case of a backward query is analogous):
• Let P = P(P 0 , . . . , P t ) be the set of all (t + 1)-tuples of permutations (P 0 , . . . , P t ) such that P i extends the currently defined portion of P i , and such that
Then O(N, t) samples uniformly at random an element (P 0 , . . . , P t ) from P. The adversary sets P i (x) = P i (x) and returns this value.
After the above, the adversary "forgets" about P 0 , . . . , P t , and samples these afresh at the next query. It is clear that this lazy sampling process gives the same distribution as sampling the tuple (P 0 , . . . , P t ) at the start of the game. Thus, giving the adversary oracle access to O(N, t) is equivalent to giving the adversary oracle access to (E, P 1 , . . . , P t ), up to the cosmetic change that E is replaced by E −1 . We therefore have:
With O(N, t) defined as above, we have:
where Q 0 , . . . , Q t are independent random permutations.
(We emphasize that k 0 , . . . , k t are implicit arguments to O(N, t).) Our hybrid will be an oracleÕ(N, t) (also taking k 0 , . . . , k t as implicit inputs) that uses a slightly different lazy sampling procedure to define the permutations P 0 , . . . , P t . Say that a sequence of partially defined permutations is consistent if P(P 0 , . . . , P t ) = ∅, with P(·) defined as in the description of O(N, t) above. Initially,Õ(N, t) also sets the permutations P 0 , . . . , P t to be undefined everywhere. Upon receiving (say) a forward query P i (x),Õ(N, t) uses the following lazy sampling procedure to answer:
n be the set of values y such that defining P i (x) = y maintains the consistency of P 0 , . . . , P t , besides maintaining the fact that P i is a permutation. ThenÕ(N, t) samples a value y uniformly from U , sets P i (x) = y, and returns y.
Inverse queries are lazy sampled the same way. While not immediately apparent, the above lazy sampling procedure produces a slightly different distribution of outputs than the first lazy sampling procedure.
Theorem 1 is an direct consequence of Proposition 1 and of the following two propositions.
Proposition 2. Let q < N/100. With O(N, t) andÕ(N, t) defined as above, 
for every adversary A making at mostueries, where Q 0 , . . . , Q t are independent random permutations.
Proposition 2 is the main technical hurdle in our proof. Its proof, however, is entirely combinatorial, given that we actually show this bound holds even when A sees the keys k 0 , . . . , k t . The presence of keys is therefore actually irrelevant for this proposition 1 . We refer to Appendix A for more details. The proof of Proposition 3, on the other hand, is fairly accessible, and also contains those ingredients that have the most "cryptographic interest".
Proof (of Proposition 3.). We make the standard assumption that the adversary never makes a redundant query (querying P ±1 i (x) twice or querying, e.g., P i (x) after obtaining x as an answer to a query P −1 i (y)). We modifyÕ(N, t) to use a slightly different lazy sampling method, equivalent toÕ(N, t)'s original sampling method. In this new method, we also maintain a flag bad which is originally set to false.
O(N, t)'s new sampling method is as follows: when faced with a query P i (x), O(N, t) samples a value y uniformly at random from the remaining range of P i (x), that is, uniformly at random from
O(N, t) then checks if setting P i (x) = y would make P 0 , . . . , P t inconsistent; if so, it sets bad = true, and resumes its original sampling method for the rest of the game (including to answer the last query); otherwise, it sets P i (x) = y, and returns y. Inverse queries are treated the same. We can also define a value for the bad flag when the adversary has oracle access to the random permutations (Q 0 , Q 1 , . . . , Q t ). Originally, set bad = false and select random values k 0 , . . . , k t . Set Q 0 , . . . , Q t to be undefined at all points, and use lazy sampling to define them by simulating the lazy sampling process for P 0 , . . . , P t up until bad = true; after bad = true, simply keep lazy sampling each permutation Q i while ignoring bad as well as k 0 , . . . , k t .
Obviously, the probability bad is set to true is equal in both worlds, and the two worlds behave identically up until bad = true. Thus (a standard argument shows that) the adversary's advantage is upper bounded by the probability that bad is set to true.
For simplicity, we upper bound the probability that bad becomes true when the adversary has oracle access to Q 0 , . . . , Q t . In this case, note that it is equivalent to set the bad flag by sampling the values k 0 , . . . , k t randomly at the end of the game, and then checking whether these values are inconsistent with the partially defined permutations Q 0 , . . . , Q t . (To recall, k 0 , . . . , k t are inconsistent with Q 0 , . . . , Q t if there exist no permutations Q 0 , . . . , Q t such that
Given the partially defined permutations Q 0 , . . . , Q t and values k 0 , . . . , k t a contradictory path is a sequence of values (x 0 , y 0 ), . . . , (x t , y t ) such that (i)
where we put x t+1 = x 0 . Because q < N/3, Lemma 3 of Section A implies 2 that Q 0 , . . . , Q t is consistent with k 0 , . . . , k t if and only if there exists no contradictory path. Since each Q i contains at most q defined input-output pairs (x i , y i ) at the end of the game, there are at most q t+1 possible different sequences ((x 0 , y 0 ), . . . , (x t , y t )) such that Q(x i ) = y i for 0 ≤ i ≤ t. For each of these sequences, the probability that the random selection of k 0 , . . . , k t creates a contradictory path is upper bounded by (t + 1)N −t , since the condition k i = y i ⊕ x i+1 must be satisfied for all but one value of i, 0 ≤ i ≤ t, and we can union bound over this value of i. Hence, by a union bound over the (at most) q t+1 possible different sequences, the probability that bad is set to true is at most
Z t as desired.
An upper bound
For any number of rounds t, there is an (non-adaptive) attack with a query complexity of roughly t2 t t+1 n , thus meeting the bound on the query complexity for t = 2. Note that this is not an attack in the practical sense, as the computational cost is higher than brute force. The idea of this attack is to actually construct (with high probability) a contradictory path for each possible key.
1. Make 2 t t+1 n queries to E and each of the oracles P 1 to P t . Denote the set of queries to P i by P i and queries to E k by M.
For each key candidate (k
is the correct value of the key; (d) otherwise, it is certainly the wrong value of the key.
To get a better reduction on key-candidates, a bit more than t2
Attacks
The bounds proved earlier are information-theoretic bounds which take into account only the number of queries of the random permutations made by an adversary. Of equal interest are attacks which take the computational complexity into account. In this section we consider only attacks in the single key-model. Note that, in the case where all round-keys are independent, related-key attacks exist trivially. However, the situation might be very different in the case where all round-keys are identical, see Section 7 for further discussion on this point.
Daemen's attack for t = 1
For the original Even-Mansour construction (in our setting, this corresponds to t = 1), a differential attack has been published by Daemen [10] meeting the lower bound of 2 n/2 evaluations of P proven by Even and Mansour. It can be described as follows:
For a random permutation P , only very few values of v are expected to satisfy
The wrong candidates can be easily filtered in step (3b) by testing them on a few additional encryptions. After encrypting s plaintext pairs, one has to perform about 2·2 n /s evaluations of P . The expression 2(s + 2 n /s) is minimal for s = 2 n/2 . In this case, the time complexity is 2 n/2 with a storage requirement of 2 n/2 plaintext pairs.
A meet in the middle attack
There is a meet in the middle attack on the t-permutation construction which finds the keys in time and space 2 tn/2 for t > 1. This is a straight-forward attack given here for the case t = 2:
1. From a pair of messages (m 1 , m 2 ), compute and save in a sorted table, T , the values
Get the encryptions c 1 and c 2 of m 1 respectively m 2 .
For all 2
n possible values of
and look for a match in T . 4. Each match gives candidate values for the three keys, which are tested against additional encryptions.
A fundamental cryptographic property of a block cipher is its Fourier spectrum that completely defines the cipher via the Fourier transform and whose distribution is closely related to the resistance against linear cryptanalysis [9] .
To support security claims, block cipher designs usually come with arguments why these Fourier coefficients cannot take values exploitable by an attacker. In most cases, however, formal proofs of these properties appear technically infeasible and designers limit themselves to demonstrating upper bounds on trail probabilities, that can be seen as summands to obtain the actual Fourier coefficients. This solution is usually denoted as the practical security approach for statistical cryptanalysis. Such an approach does not allow an accurate estimation of the data complexity of statistical attacks, that typically depends on numerous trails [24, 28] .
As opposed to that, we analyze the construction of key alternating cipher following a provable security approach, by directly investigating its Fourier coefficients. In addition, we provide a more informative analysis than for standard block ciphers, as we study the distribution of the Fourier coefficients for the cipher over all keys, rather than bounding the mean value of this distribution. This is made possible by the use of fixed public permutations in our construction. More precisely, in a key-alternating cipher using t ≥ 2 fixed public permutations, we study the distribution of the Fourier coefficients over all cipher keys. If these permutations are close to the average over all permutations, we show that this distribution turns out to be very close to that over all permutations, suggesting that the t-round key-alternating construction is theoretically sound from this perspective. This implies that it behaves well with respect to linear cryptanalysis.
On the contrary, the distribution of Fourier coefficients for a fixed point in the Fourier spectrum is nearly degenerated for the key-alternating cipher with t = 1 (the Even-Mansour cipher). This emphasizes the constructive effect of having 2 and more rounds in the key-alternating cipher.
Fourier coefficients over all permutations
Here we recall the definitions of Fourier coefficients and Fourier spectrum as well as the distribution of Fourier coefficients over all permutations. We also introduce some notations we will be using throughout the section.
Notations. The canonical scalar product of two vectors a, b ∈ {0, 1} n is denoted by a T b. We denote the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 as Fourier coefficients and Fourier spectrum. For a permutation P : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , its Fourier coefficient at point (α, β) is defined as
The collection of Fourier coefficients at all points (α, β) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n is called the Fourier spectrum of P . For a block cipher F , we denote the Fourier coefficient at point (α, β) as W . When n ≥ 5, the distribution of the Fourier coefficient W P α0,β0 with α 0 , β 0 = 0 over all n-bit permutations can be approximated by the following distribution up to continuity correction:
The distribution of Fact 1 is the reference point throughout the section: A block cipher cannot have a better distribution of Fourier coefficients than that close to Fact 1.
Fourier coefficients in the single-round Even-Mansour cipher
Let F be the basic single-round Even-Mansour cipher, that is, a fixed public permutation P surrounded by two additions with keys k 0 and k 1 , respectively (see Figure 1 ). If W P β0,β1 is the Fourier coefficient for the underlying permutation P at point (β 0 , β 1 ), then the Fourier coefficient for the cipher at this point is
Now consider the distribution of W F β0,β1 with β 0 = 0, β 1 = 0 taken over all keys (k 0 , k 1 ). Its support contains exactly two points: W P β0,β1 and −W P β0,β1 . Thus, the value of W F β0,β1 almost does not vary from key to key. This is crucially different from the reference point -the distribution over all permutations of Fact 1.
Fourier coefficients in the t-round key-alternating cipher
Now we state the main result of this section. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Fix a point (β 0 , β t ) with β 0 , β t = 0 in the Fourier spectrum of the t-round key-alternating n-bit block cipher with round permutations P 1 , . . . , P t for t ≥ 2 and sufficiently high n. Then the distribution of the Fourier coefficient W P1,...,Pt β0,βt at this point over all keys K is approximated by:
assuming that the distributions over points of the Fourier spectra of the permutations P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t, have variances satisfying
and that for any given key K, the signs of the Fourier coefficients behave independently for different points. The deviation of the permutations P i from the mean over all permutations Q i is quantified by factor (1 + ε):
Interestingly, the latter deviation ε from the mean in (7) is small for most choices of the P i . For instance, in case t = 2, it can be shown that over all permutations, mean and variance of each summand in (7) are 2 2n and 2 4n+2 , respectively. The whole sum then approximately follows a normal distribution
). This means that for randomly drawn permutations individually for each nontrivial point (β 0 , β t ). Appropriate choices for the P i should have distributions close to N (0, 2 n ) for each nontrivial point, not only for some of them. Conversely, the distribution of the Fourier coefficient at the (trivial) point (β 0 , 0) differs from (5) for any choice of the P i , since it is constant over the keys.
Note also that the result of Theorem 2 does not require the underlying permutations to be different. Moreover, it does not require the permutations P i to be randomly drawn from the set of all permutations, but holds for any fixed choice of permutations satisfying (6) . To obtain a distribution close to ideal, however, the set of underlying permutations has to ensure a small deviation ε in (7). As argued above, drawing the underlying permutations at random from the set of all permutations is highly likely to result in a very small deviation ε from the average.
Summarising, the results of Theorem 2 suggest that once the small number of t ≥ 2 underlying permutations are carefully chosen and fixed, the t-round keyalternating cipher for each secret key is likely to be statistically sound which rules out some crucial cryptanalytic distinguishers. More precisely, the distributions of the Fourier coefficients for the t-round key-alternating cipher over all keys become close to those over all permutations.
Note that, in contrast to the reference point, it is possible to identify large but efficiently representable subsets of keys where the distribution is again degenerated, as in the case for t = 1. Examples of such sets are sets of keys where one fixes all keys k 1 up to k t−1 . For any point (β 0 , β 1 ) the value of W P1,...,Pt β0,βt takes on only two possible values -over all possible sub-keys k 0 , k t . However, it seems unlikely that this can be used in an attack.
Practical constructions
In this section, we discuss possible practical realisations of the t-round keyalternating cipher.
A natural approach to building a practical cipher following the t-permutation construction is to base the t fixed permutations on a block cipher by fixing some keys. With t = 1, this corresponds to the original Even-Mansour construction, so the security level is limited to 2 n/2 operations with n denoting the cipher's block length. With a 128-bit block cipher such as the AES, we therefore only obtain a security level of 2 64 in terms of computational complexity, so it is advisable to choose t > 1.
In the following we describe a sample construction with t = 2, that is, we consider the 2-round key alternating construction with permutations P 1 and P 2 and the keys k 0 , k 1 , k 2 .
AES
2 : a block cipher proposal based on AES
The construction is defined by fixing two randomly chosen 128-bit AES-128 keys, which specifies the permutations P 1 and P 2 . The key is comprised by three independently chosen 128-bit secret keys k 0 , k 1 , k 2 . Let AES[k] denote the (10-round) AES-128 algorithm with the 128-bit key k and the 128-bit quantities π 1 , π 2 be defined based on the first 256 bits of the binary digit expansion of π = 3.1415 . . . :
Then we denote the resulting 2-permutation construction by AES
. Its action on the 128-bit plaintext m is defined as:
Security. Any attack on AES 2 in the single secret-key model with complexity below 2
85 will have to make use of AES with a fixed known key in a non-black box manner. On the other hand, we are aware of no attack with a computational complexity of less than 2 128 . Moreover, if the distribution of Fourier coefficients for AES[π 1 ] and AES[π 2 ] meets the assumption of average behaviour, Theorem 2 suggests that the Fourier coefficients for AES 2 are distributed close to ideal which implies resistance against basic linear cryptanalysis and some of its variants. Intuitively, this construction can be seen to arguably transfer the security properties for AES with a single randomly fixed key to the entire cipher as a set of permutations. For AES 2 , we explicitly do not claim any related-, knownor chosen-key security.
Performance. AES
2 can be implemented very efficiently in software on generalpurpose processors. The two AES keys π 1 and π 2 are fixed and, therefore, the round keys for the two AES transformations can be precomputed, so there is no need to implement the key scheduling algorithm of AES. This ensures high key agility of AES 2 . On the Westmere architecture generation of Intel general-purpose processors, AES 2 can be implemented using the AES-NI instruction set [18] . As the AES round instructions are pipelined, we fully utilise the pipeline by processing four independent plaintext blocks in parallel implementing the basic electronic codebook mode (ECB) and counter mode (CTR). The performance of these implementations on recent processors is demonstrated and compared to two conventional implementations of AES-128 (i.e. without AES-NI instructions) -the bitsliced implementation of [20] and the OpenSSL 1.0.0e implementation based on lookup tables. All numbers are given in cycles per byte (cpb).
Intel Xeon X5670
Intel Core i7 640M It turns out that on both platforms, the performance of AES 2 is almost equal to half that of AES, indicating that the overhead is very low. Compared to the best implementations of the AES which are in widespread use now on standard platforms, AES 2 provides a performance improvement of almost factor three and higher with the AES-NI instruction set.
Conclusion, Open Problems and Future Work
In this paper we gave the first formal treatment of the key-alternating cipher in a provable setting. For two or more rounds an attacker needs to query the oracles at least 2 2n/3 times for having a reasonable success probability. Furthermore, we studied the security of the construction with respect to statistical attacks, arguing that even for t = 2 linear attacks do not seem to be applicable. Finally we gave a concrete proposal mimicking the construction for t = 2. There are several lines of future work and open problems we like to mention.
On the theoretical side, it seems unlikely that the bounds given here are tight. Thus, improving them is an important open problem. We actually conjecture that the correct bound on the query complexity is roughly 2 t/(t+1)n . As a first step, deriving bounds that increase with the number of rounds is a goal worth aiming for. Secondly, for now, we have to assume that all round keys are independent. For aesthetical reasons, but also from a practical point of view (see below) it would be nice to prove bounds for the case that all round keys are identical.
On the practical side, mainly for efficiency reasons but also due to resistance against related-key attacks, several variants for t = 2 are worth studying. First of all, since the security level is at most 2 n , due to the meet in the middle attack, one could be tempted to derive three n-bit keys k 0 , k 1 , and k 2 from one n-bit word. The simplest case here is to have all three keys identical. Taking P and Q different, we are not aware of any attack with computational complexity below 2 n . Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that such a construction provides some security against certain types of related-key attacks as well. The best attacks we are aware of in such a setting has birthday complexity 2 n/2 . See Appendix C for the details.
Eventually, it is an interesting open problem to determine whether the results in this work can be used as directions for alternative block cipher designs, e.g. with minimum key scheduling algorithms. As a typical example, one could consider the possibility to generate public permutations from a variant of the AES, where the round keys would be replaced with simple constants. In general, such an approach could lead to efficient lightweight designs. Interestingly, it is also the direction taken, to a certain extent, by the recently proposed block cipher LED [19] . In its 64-bit version, this cipher just iterates blocks made of 4 rounds and the addition of the master key.
Another tempting way, in order to increase efficiency, is to choose Q = P . Similarly, it may be advantageous to have Q = P −1 , which has the further advantage that the decryption and encryption operations are similar, except for using the keys in reverse order. However, with Q = P −1 there is an attack which finds the value of k 0 ⊕ k 2 using 2 n/2 queries and similar time. After k 0 ⊕ k 2 is known the cipher is easily distinguishable from a random permutation. Also, with Q = P but now assuming that k 0 ⊕ k 2 is known, one finds the secret keys using 2 n/2 queries and similar time. 
A Proof of Proposition 2
In this section we provide a proof of Proposition 2, which constitutes the most technical part of our paper. The argument is structured as follows: Firstly, we allow the adversary A to see the values k 0 , . . . , k t (in fact, we even allow A to choose these values); obviously, such an adversary can only perform better than an adversary without knowledge of k 0 , . . . , k t . Secondly, we argue that the k i 's can be set to 0 n without any loss in advantage. The problem then reduces to upper bounding the adversary's advantage at distinguishing two different methods of lazy sampling permutations P 0 , . . . , P t such that
We then directly argue (by "low-level" combinatorics) that, for any given query, the statistical distance between the two types of sampling is small. In order to facilitate the application of this statistical distance bound on a single query to the general q-query setting, we introduce another abstraction (of potential interest on its own) that we call sample distinguishability. As it applies to our setting, the sample distinguishability game lets the adversary "set up" each of its queries as it wants; namely, it can partially define the permutations P 0 , . . . , P t on at most q points each (subject to the consistency constraint), and then request its oracle-which is either O(N, t) orÕ(N, t)-to answer a query of its choice, for that choice of P 0 , . . . , P t ; at its next query, the adversay can set up P 0 , . . . , P t again from scratch, and so on. Clearly such an adversary with "set-up power" has advantage at least that of a standard adversary. We then combine the statistical distance bound for a single query (Lemma 2 below) with a simple lemma relating sampling distinguishability to single-sample statistical distance (Lemma 1 below) to obtain the final result (restated as Lemma 5 below, that is equivalent to Proposition 2).
Define
and
Obviously, it suffices to show that Adv A simulates A; let k 0 , . . . , k t be the keys chosen by A. When A makes a query P i (x), A queries P i (x) and returns P i (x) ⊕ k i to A; when A queries P
It is easy to check that when A 's oracle is O(N, t) (resp.Õ(N, t)), then A provides A with a perfect simulation of O(N, t) (resp.Õ(N, t)) on keys k 0 , . . . , k t . It follows that A 's advantage is exactly A's.
The rest of our effort focuses on upper bounding Adv We now abstract the problem of distinguishing the oracles O(N, t),Õ(N, t) into a more general type of game (that is also more generous to the adversary). This game is the "sample distinguishability" game referred to above.
Let (X α ) α∈B be a sequence of random variables indexed by some finite set B, where each X α takes values in some finite set S. We write A (Xα) α∈B to mean an adversary A with oracle access to a sequence of random variables indexed by the elements of B. More precisely, the adversary's query sequence has the form (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α q ), where each α i ∈ B; such a query sequence is answered by sampling X α1 , . . . , X αq , and returning these values to the adversary. Every sample is taken independently of previous samples; in particular, if the adversary queries the same X α twice, then X α is sampled twice independently. The adversary is adaptive, and can query its oracles in any order it wishes.
We next define the notion of (adaptive) sample distinguishability.
Definition 1. Let (X α , Y α ) α∈B denote a family of pairs of random variables indexed by a finite set B, where each random variable takes values in the same finite range S. We define
with the probabilities being taken over the randomness of the distributions and over the adversary's coins, if any. We also define
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A making at mostueries.
We note that non-adaptive sample distinguishability-in which case the adversary must announce its sequence of queries (α 1 , . . . , α q ) before receiving any answers-reduces to upper bounding the maximum statistical distance of the form
is the product distribution 3 (X α1 , . . . , X αq ) and likewise for (Y αi ) q i=1 , and with this maximum being taken over all possible sequences (α 1 , . . . , α q ). Since all samples are taken independently (in the adaptive as well as in the nonadaptive game), it might intuitively seem that adapativity doesn't help, but, surprisingly, it does. (An example appears at the end of this section.) Lemma 1. Let (X α , Y α ) α∈B be a set of pairs of random variables indexed by the finite set B. Then
Proof. We use a coupling argument. For each α ∈ B, let (X α ,Ỹ α ) be a maximal coupling of X α and Y α ; this meansX α andỸ α are defined on the same probability space, such that
and such thatX α is equidistributed to X α andỸ α is equidistributed to Y α . (That such distributionsX α ,Ỹ α exist is a standard fact.) When we sampleX α we thus "automatically" sampleỸ α , and vice-versa. When an adversary A interacts with oracle (X α ) α∈B , let bad be the event that, for one of the queries α asked by A, X α =Ỹ α (note that onlyX α is returned to A). We likewise define bad when the adversary interacts with oracle (Ỹ α ) α∈B . Note that as long as bad = false, the two oracles are equidistributed. (Indeed, the entity performing the queries is "doing the same thing" in either world: namely, sampling the required pair (X α ,Ỹ α ) and returning the common value of this pair.) The adversary's advantage is at most the probability of setting bad = true which, by a union over theueries, is at most
Note: We believe Lemma 1 is far from tight. Moreover, it currently constitutes the main "bottleneck" in our security bound. One could improve Lemma 1 by showing, for example, that the advantage of an adaptive sample distinguishability adversary is upper bounded by a constant (e.g., 2) times the advantage of a non-adaptive adversary, but we do not know of such a bound. See also the example relating adaptivity to non-adaptivity at the end of this section. To state our main technical result we need to define the family of pairs (X α , Y α ) a∈B that we are interested in applying Lemma 1 to. Parameters for this family will be N , q and t. Recall that upper bounding Adv
(A) for a q-query adversary A means upper bounding A's distinguishing advantage between two different lazy sampling methods for a sequence of permutations P 0 , . . . , P t such that
In the following, we model the (partially defined) permutations by their associated (partial) matchings. That is, a partially defined permutation on {0, 1} n is defined by a matching with left vertex set {0, 1} n and right vertex set {0, 1} n , in the natural way. Composing sevaral permutations corresponds to gluing the associated matchings side by side.
Let V 0 , . . . , V t , V t+1 be sets of vertices with |V i | = N , and where we identify V t+1 with V 0 (i.e., V t+1 and V 0 are two different names for the same set).
A sequence of matchings M = (M 0 , . . . , M t+1 ) where M i is a perfect matching between V i and V i+1 is called circular if every path starting at a vertex v ∈ V 0 following the edges in M 0 , . . . , M t ends at the same vertex v ∈ V t+1 = V 0 . Thus, circularity is the matching equivalent of (9) .
Given a sequence M = (M 0 , . . . , M t ) where each M i is a partial matching between V i and V i+1 , we let M(M ) be the set of all circular sequences M extending M , i.e. the set of all sequences
(This fits our previous definition of consistency, restricted to the case k 0 = . . . = k t = 0 n .) Let a q-configuration be a pair (v 0 , M ) such that (i) M = (M 0 , . . . , M t ) is a consistent sequence of partial matchings such that |M i | ≤ q for all i, (ii) v 0 ∈ V 0 is nonadjacent to M 0 . Our index set B for the family of pairs (X α , Y α ) α∈B will be exactly the set of all q-configurations. That is,
We now describe, for a given α = (v 0 , M ) ∈ B, the distributions X α and Y α .
Let α = (v 0 , M ) be a q-configuration, M = (M 0 , . . . , M t ). For any vertex u ∈ V 1 nonadjacent to M 0 , we write M ∪ {(v 0 , u)} for the sequence of partial matchings (M 0 ∪ {(v 0 , u)}, M 1 , . . . , M t ). Let U ⊆ V 1 be the set of vertices u such that M ∪ {(v 0 , u)} is consistent. We define
We note that X α is a probability distribution on U , and that X α is equidistributed to O(N, t) queried at P 0 (v 0 ) with keys k 0 = . . . = k t = 0 n and with P 0 , . . . , P t defined such that P i (x) = y ⇐⇒ (x, y) ∈ M i . As for Y α , it is simply the uniform distribution on U . Thus Y α is equidistributed toÕ (N, t) under the same correspondence. (Note the restriction to queries of the form P 0 (·) is without loss of generality, since the adversary can "set up" the matchings as its wants in the sample distinguishability game.)
The crux of our proof is the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let q < N/100 and let t ≥ 1. Then for any q-configuration α = (v 0 , M ), we have
where ρ = 2.05qt/N , with X α and Y α defined as above.
We need two more small results before giving the proof of Lemma 2. For a sequence of partial matchings M = (M 0 , . . . , M t ), a path of length t + 1 using edges from the partial matchings M 0 , . . . , M t (possibly "wrapping around" through V 0 = V t+1 ) is contradictory if it contains t + 2 vertices (i.e., if it is not a cycle-this is also a restatement of our previous definition of a contradictory path, restricted to the case where the k i 's are 0 n ). Obviously, if a partial matching contains a contradictory path it cannot be consistent. The next lemma gives a partial converse. Proof. We show that M can be extended to a circular sequence of perfect matchings M . The extension follows three steps: (i) for each edge in M 0 , if such an edge is not already in a path of length t + 1, then we complete a non-contradictory path of length t+1 containing that edge; (ii) we arbitrarily extend the matchings M 1 , . . . , M t to perfect matchings M 1 , . . . , M t ; (iii) we complete the matching M 0 to a perfect matching M 0 in the unique way that will make M = (M 0 , . . . , M t ) circular.
Steps (ii) and (iii) can obviously carried out if step (i) succeeds, so it remains to prove that step (i) is possible.
In the process of carrying out step (i), let (v 0 , v 1 ) be an edge in M 0 that is not yet in a cycle, v 0 ∈ V 0 , v 1 ∈ V 1 . Say that a node is "free" if it is adjacent to no edges (note that to start with, there are at least N/3 free nodes in each V i ).
be the maximal path containing (v 0 , v 1 ), where v i ∈ V i , where ≤ t + 1 and k ≥ 1. By assumption that there are no contradictory paths, k < . If k = − 1 then we can simply connect v k and v by an edge. Otherwise, as long as there are free nodes left in each of the layers V k+1 , . . . , V −1 , we can use these to connect v k to v by a path. However, we start with at least N/3 free nodes in each layer, and we have only at most N/3 paths to create (one for each of M 0 ). Hence such free nodes will always exist.
The following is an elementary observation that trusting readers can take for granted.
Lemma 4. Let a set U be the disjoint union of sets R, T , and let ρ ∈ [0,
. Let Y be the uniform distribution over U and let X be a random variable such that Pr[X = u 1 ] = Pr[X = u 2 ] for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ R and such that
for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . Then
Proof. We start by noting that since there must exist some u 1 ∈ U such that Pr[X = u 1 ] ≤ 1/|U |, and also some u 2 ∈ U such that Pr[X = u 2 ] ≥ 1/|U |, the second condition implies that
for all s ∈ U . We also note that ρ ∈ [0,
/|U | for all s, the lemma obviously holds when |T | = |U |. We can therefore assume R = ∅.
Let p be the probability Pr[X = u] for some u ∈ R (where by assumption this probability does not depend on the choice of u ∈ R). We consider two cases according to whether
≤ |T |ρ/|U |.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 2).
Assume first there is a path in M 1 , . . . , M t ending at v 0 ∈ V t+1 = V 0 . Then, obviously, |U | = 1 and ∆(X α , Y α ) = 0. Thus, we can assume there is no such path. In view of applying Lemma 4, let R ⊆ U be the set of free nodes in V 1 (as defined in the proof of Lemma 3), and let T = V 1 \R ≤ q. Because q < N/100 < N/3, Lemma 3 implies that R in fact consists of all free nodes in V 1 . Thus |U | ≥ |R| ≥ N − 2q, and
Put X = X α . It is easy to check that Pr[ 
for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ U . For every circular matching sequence M ∈ M(M ), let C(M ) be the consistent sequence of partial matchings obtained by restricting M to edges that are either in M or else in a path that contains an edge in M 0 . Note that each partial matching in C(M ) has size at most 2q, and that the matching from V 0 to V 1 in C(M ) coincides with M 0 . Moreover, let
be the set of all such sequences of partial matchings. We note that every element of M(M ) extends some (in fact, exactly one) element of C(M ). (Though several elements of M(M ) may extend the same element of C(M ).)
Also note that neither v 0 nor u 1 nor u 2 are endpoints of an edge in the first matching of any K ∈ C(M ), since the first matching of K is M 0 .
We will show (12) by showing, more strongly, that
for any K ∈ C(M ). The fact that K ∪{(v 0 , u 1 )} and K ∪{(v 0 , u 2 )} are consistent follows from the fact that K ∪ {(v 0 , u 1 )}, K ∪ {(v 0 , u 2 )} contain no contradictory path (completing cycles cannot add a contradictory path) and that K has at most 2q < N/3 edges per matching. Fix therefore K ∈ C(M ) and let
Note there is a bijection between elements of M(L j ) and tuples (K 1 , . . . , K t ) such that K i is a complete matching extending K i and such that u j ∈ V 1 is connected to v 0 ∈ V t+1 by a path of edges from K 1 , . . . , K t . (This uses the fact that K is picked from C(M ).) Letting K j be the set of such sequences (K 1 , . . . , K t ) for j = 1, 2, it therefore suffices to show that
Note that any element of K j can be "built" the following way: first we extend each K i , i ≥ 1, to a partial matching K i by adding at most one edge to K i , such that u j is connected by a path of edges in K 1 , . . . , K t to v 0 ∈ V t+1 , and such that each edge in K i \K i (if any) is an edge on this path; second, we complete each K i to a complete matching K i , arbitrarily for each i. Furthermore, we can construct the partial matchings K 1 , . . . , K t by the following process. We choose a path from u j ∈ V 1 to v 0 ∈ V t+1 that is compatible with the matchings K 1 , . . . , K t , and augment these matchings by the edges on that path. More specifically, let w 1 = u j . Let t ≥ 1 be the smallest value such that there exists a path from v 0 ∈ V t+1 to a vertex in V t by edges in K t , K t−1 , . . . , K t , and let w t ∈ V t be the endpoint of this path. (Possibly, t = t + 1 and w t = v 0 .) In fact, t ≥ 2, as follows from the fact that M 1 and M 2 are both consistent. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, we construct w i+1 ∈ V i+1 from w i ∈ V i as follows: if w i is incident to an edge of the matching K i , let w i+1 be the other endpoint of this edge; otherwise, let w i+1 be any vertex in V i+1 that does not lie on a path of edges in K i+1 , . . . , K t −1 whose endpoint in V t is not w t (i.e., either a path of length t − i − 1 starting at w i+1 does not exist in K i+1 , . . . , K t −1 , or else the endpoint of this path is w t ). It is easy to see that such a w i+1 always exists by the consistency of M j . Furthermore, we note for future use that w i+1 can always be chosen to be any free vertex in V i+1 , if such a vertex exists, as long as i + 1 < t . Once w 1 , . . . , w t are defined, we add to K i the edge (w i , w i+1 ) (if this edge is not already present) for i = 1, . . . , t −1, and we leave K t , . . . , K t untouched, resulting in the sequence of partial matchings (K 1 , . . . , K t ). There is obviously, by construction, a path from u j ∈ V 1 to v 0 ∈ V t+1 using edges in K 1 , . . . , K t , and K i differs from K i only, if at all, by an edge in this path. Furthermore, any sequence of partial matchings (K 1 , . . . , K t ) can be obtained by this process.
We have described a two-stage construction of an element of K j , whereby the matchings K 1 , . . . , K t are first constructed (i.e., a path from u j to v 0 is first constructed, using the process described above), followed by an arbitrary extension of these matchings to full matchings K 1 , . . . , K t . We now make a cosmetic change to this process which will help us count the size of K j . We will first construct K 1 , then K 2 , etc. Let t and w t be as above; also let w 1 = u j as above. For i = 1 to t − 1 we do the following: (i) choose w i+1 as described above, and add the edge (w i , w i+1 ) to K i−1 to form K i ; (ii) extend K i arbitrarily to a full matching K i . Finally, for i = t to t, let K i = K i and extend K i to an arbitrary full matching K i .
The above sequence of choices determining K 1 , . . . , K t can be viewed as a tree of depth t, whereby the i-th level of the tree corresponds to the construction of K t . The number of leaves in this tree is |K j |. To upper and lower bound |K j | we will upper and lower bound the degree of each non-leaf node. Let e i = |K i | be the number of edges in K i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Consider a node r at level i of the tree (where the root has level 1). Say, first, that i < t − 1. This node r specifies (among others) a choice of w 1 , . . . , w i , since the first i − 1 levels of the tree determine K 1 , . . . , K i−1 . We distinguish two cases: when w i is incident to an edge in K i , and when it is not. If w i is incident to an edge in K i then there is a single choice for w i+1 and exactly (N − e i )! ways completing the matching K i , since the number of ways to complete the matching K i is the number of permutations on N − e i points. In this case, therefore, r has degree (N − e i )!. In the second case, when w i is not incident to an edge in K i , then there are at least N − e i − e i+1 choices for w i+1 , by the observation made above that w i+1 can be any free node in V i+1 . Once w i+1 is chosen, determining K i , there are (N − e i − 1)! ways to extend K i to K i . Thus altogether, r has degree at least (N − e i − e i+1 )(N − e i − 1)! and at most (N − e i )!, in this case. Nextly, when i = t −1, we note that by construction of t and w t , w i cannot be adjacent to an edge of K i ; in this case, therefore, r has degree (N − e i − 1)! (since there is a unique choice for w i+1 = w t ). Finally, when i ≥ t , r has degree (N − e i )! since we just need to extend
Altogether, therefore, a lower bound for the number of leaves in the tree (i.e. a lower bound for |K j |) is
and an upper bound for the number of leaves is
Since t ≤ t + 1, dividing the lower bound by the upper bound gives
Therefore,
Since q < N/100, N − 2q > 49 50 N , and therefore (2qt)/(N − 2q) < 2.05qt/N = ρ. Thus (15) implies (14) , which concludes the proof.
Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately imply:
Lemma 5. Let (X α , Y α ) α∈B be the family of random variable pairs described before the statement of Lemma 2 (parameters for which are N, t and q), with q < N/100. Then
(where ρ = 2.05qt/N ).
A sampling distinguishing adversary for (X α , Y α ) α∈B can obviously simulate a "standard" adversary for the O(N, t)-Õ(N, t) distinguishing with keys k 0 , . . . , k t = 0 n , with equal advantage (see the remarks before Lemma 2). Thus, we obtain the following corollary, that completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. For q < N/100, we have Adv
An example where adaptivity helps for sample distinguishability. We conclude by showing, for general interest, an example for which adaptivity helps in the sample distinguishability game.
We use only two pairs of random variables (X 1 , Y 1 ), (X 2 , Y 2 ) taking values in a range S = {a, b, c}. Let ε, ε , δ > 0 with ε < ε. Define:
We put ε small (so that ε 2 is negligible) and put ε = 1.99ε. We also put δ = 0.1ε 2 . For ε sufficiently small, we have that ε +δ = ∆(X 1 , Y 1 ) < ∆(X 2 , Y 2 ) = 2ε. We give the adversary two queries. The best non-adaptive strategy is then for the adversary to query (X 1 , Y 1 ) twice, even though ∆(X 1 , Y 1 ) < ∆(X 2 , Y 2 ). Indeed, ∆(X 
B Proof of Theorem 2
Consider a fixed point (β 0 , β t ), β 0 , β t = 0, in the Fourier spectrum for the t-round key-alternating cipher with keys K := (k 0 , . . . , k t ). Denote by β i , 1 ≤ i < t, the intermediate selection pattern at the addition of k i , and set β := (β 1 , . . . , β t−1 ) and Γ := (β 0 , . . . , β t ). By the theorem of trail composition (Theorem 7. 
so that W P1,...,Pt β0,βt
If, for any given key K, the quantities Γ T K behave independently over different β, as assumed in the claim of the theorem, we have that
with r ∼ Bern( 1 2 ), where the distribution is taken over the keys, and Bern(p) denotes the Bernoulli distribution with success probability p.
Note that E[X β ] = A sequence of independent (one can consider the X β as independent since the signs are independent) random variables fulfilling (20) and (21) obeys the Lindeberg formulation of the central limit theorem [31, p. 488] (note that though we operate with finite numbers of summands, the conditions at infinity have to be checked for any application of the central limit theorem). Therefore, we have the following approximation, since the number of summands is high (it is exponential in n and in all interesting cases n ≥ 32): Recall from (7) that for the t-round cipher with the permutations P 1 , . We require condition (6) essentially to ensures that we sum over sufficiently many possible selection patterns for β such that we can invoke the central limit theorem. This in particular excludes the trivial case where all P i are linear, in which their variances would be zero, and the sum in (16) would only have one summand.
C Attacks on the variants of the double construction C.1 Attack on variant with Q = P and k 0 ⊕ k 2 = α known This variant succumbs to a (variant of the) slide attack. The assumptions of the attack are that P = Q and that k 0 ⊕ k 2 = α is known.
Slide attacks consider slid pairs. A slid pair is a pair of encryptions such that an intermediate value in one encryption equals the plaintext value of the other encryption.
In our case a slid pair is two encryptions (m, c) and (m,c) such that
Since P is bijective this is the same as
